Video of Khe Sanh Combat Base
receiving incoming from NVA positions located in the surrounding hills
Khe
Sanh had been garrisoned by Americans since 1962. General William
Westmoreland, commander of
U.S.
forces in
Vietnam
, felt maintaining a presence at Khe Sanh was critically important. It
served as a patrol base for interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as the
western terminus for the defensive line along the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ), and as a barrier to Communist efforts to carry the fighting into
the populated coastal regions of South Vietnam. By early 1968, 6,000
Marines at Khe Sanh were surrounded by 20,000 North Vietnamese troops. The
siege began on
January 21, 1968
. In a report dated February 18, the New
York Times explained the importance of Khe Sanh, noting that this
area in northwest
South Vietnam
provided a base for allied operations against the infiltration by the
Communists of men and supplies into the south. After the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) surrounded the Marine position at Khe Sanh, allied forces were
unable to inhibit this infiltration; it became too dangerous for the
Marines to leave their base in sufficient numbers to greatly affect the
movement of enemy forces. Although that situation may have reduced the
strategic value of Khe Sanh in any conventional sense of the word,
American military commanders believed the
United States
would suffer a heavy psychological blow if they retreated from Khe Sanh.
Unlike the Americans, the North Vietnamese
were unable to hold fixed positions due to the efficacy of allied
firepower. As a result, the Communists concentrated on harassing and
disrupting allied forces. The American military command concluded that the
only way to stop the disruption was to destroy enemy forces in sufficient
numbers. The American commanders hoped that at Khe Sanh they would be able
to kill enemy troops in a ratio of 10 to 1, 20 to 1, or even 30 to 1. The
Americans clung to their belief in the value of a positive kill ratio in
face of compelling evidence showing they were mostly unable to achieve it.
Despite the fact that Khe Sanh was
encircled by enemy troops, the U.S. Defense Department claimed that the
fortress blocked five avenues of infiltration from
Laos
into
South Vietnam
. According to the official view of the situation in February 1968, if Khe
Sanh were abandoned, entire North Vietnamese divisions could "pour
down Route 9 [the major east-west highway below the DMZ] and four other
natural approaches through the valleys and could overrun a chain of Marine
positions; the Rockpile, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Phu Bai to the
east." This would mean that the North Vietnamese could be in a good
position to seize control of
South Vietnam
's two northernmost provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, with grave
political and psychological consequences.
This strategic rationale was secondary to
the primary reason for holding onto Khe Sanh:
Washington
was unwilling to give its enemy a psychological victory by giving ground.
One official source explained the basis for this reasoning by recalling
the first Battle of Khe Sanh, fought in 1967. "We had to put our foot
down, and for psychological and political reasons, we wouldn't want to
pull back," said the official. "What would the newspapers have
written if we had given up Khe Sanh afterward?"
Another reason for holding Khe Sanh was its
importance as the western anchor of the McNamara Line, a high-technology
barrier designed to impede the flow of Communist troops and supplies into
South Vietnam
. The barrier was supposed to stretch from the
South China Sea
to the Laotian border. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara hoped the
barrier would allow the Americans to reduce their reliance on the bombing
of
North Vietnam
, thereby increasing
Washington
's flexibility in seeking a diplomatic settlement to the war.
On February 25, General Westmoreland
expressed doubt that the North Vietnamese could stand a long war.
Responding to a question during an interview in
Saigon
about whether his fundamental strategy had been changed by the Tet
Offensive, Westmoreland replied, "Basically, I see no requirement to
change our strategy."
The key to the defense of Khe Sanh was
overwhelming air power. On March 27, senior Marine officers in
Da Nang
claimed that the effectiveness of allied airpower was so great that
"they have no plans for pulling the Marines out no matter how much
the enemy might increase his shelling at Khe Sanh." An Air Force
spokesman said that since January 22, allied airmen had dropped 80,000
tons of ordnance around Khe Sanh. "We plan to keep up the pace
indefinitely," he added.
The same report noted that airpower had
limited effectiveness. Even though 80,000 tons of ordnance amounted to
more than the nonnuclear tonnage dropped on
Japan
throughout World War II, it had not stopped enemy movement around Khe
Sanh. On March 25, a Marine patrol was halted by heavy enemy machine-gun
and mortar fire after traveling only 100 to 200 yards past the camp's
barbed wire perimeter. During the previous week, the enemy had managed to
fire 1,500 rocket, artillery and mortar rounds at the Khe Sanh base.
Other examples illustrate that the
protective aerial umbrella around Khe Sanh was less that 100 percent
effective. On February 8, enemy gunners fired hundreds of mortar rounds
into a Marine position on nearby Hill 64. The NVA assault that followed
the mortar barrage resulted in 21 men killed, 26 wounded and four Marines
missing in action. Only one Marine on Hill 64 was unscathed. Colonel
Lownds, the base commander, however, later described the Marine casualties
resulting from the fighting on Hill 64 as "light."
On February 25, a two-squad patrol,
instructed not to venture farther than 1,000 meters from the base
perimeter, vanished. Two weeks later, casualties of the so-called ghost
patrol were established as nine dead, 25 wounded, and 19 missing. A
company-size patrol on March 30 had as one of its missions the recovery of
the bodies of the ghost patrol. This second patrol suffered three dead, 71
wounded and three missing before being ordered to pull back. Only two
bodies from the ghost patrol were recovered at that time.
On April 5, the 76-day siege was officially
declared ended. Since 7,000 North Vietnamese were still reported to be in
the vicinity of Khe Sanh, however, the end of the siege was more official
than real. The North Vietnamese had fired more than 40,000 artillery,
rocket, and mortar rounds into the Marine positions during the siege.
By April, the situation had changed in the
Khe Sanh area. The New York
Times noted that the North Vietnamese had built several new roads
into South Vietnam from Laos--apparently in an effort to improve their
ability to move troops, heavy weapons and supplies into combat areas. Two
of the new roads pushed across the
South VietnamLaos
border to the north and south of the Khe Sanh combat base. No longer would
NVA troops have to endure protracted marches along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
They could be driven closer to the battlefield in trucks. Heavy weapons
and ammunition could be transported to the front more quickly and in
greater quantity.
These new logistics capabilities had
profound implications for American military commanders. General
Westmoreland had built up the Marine force at Khe Sanh to approximately
6,000 men, a figure that represented a balance between the number that
could be effectively supplied and the force level necessary to ensure
adequate defense of the combat base. Since at that time the Marine
garrison could only be supplied by air, any increase in the Communists'
ability to launch attacks against the Marine positions could tip the
balance against the Marines.
According to a New
York Times report dated May 24, both President Lyndon B. Johnson
and General Westmoreland felt the decision to defend Khe Sanh was the
proper one. They believed that the defense of the camp not only prevented
the North Vietnamese from opening a major route into South Vietnam's
populated areas, but also greatly strengthened the American initiative
toward peace talks, "for they [the Marine defenders] vividly
demonstrated to the enemy the utter futility of his attempts to win a
military victory in the South," according to the New
York Times.
Although the level of fighting fell off in
April, it was not over. On
May 30, 600
NVA attacked Marines in their night defensive positions around Khe Sanh.
The attack was supported by mortar, artillery and rocket fire. Marine
losses were 13 killed and 44 wounded. Two days later another battle took
place when a large NVA force attacked Marine positions two miles southeast
of Khe Sanh. Two-hundred-thirty North Vietnamese were reported killed in
that battle, in some of the heaviest fighting in
South Vietnam
at that time.
In a June report, New
York Times reporter Douglas Robinson described Khe Sanh as
"still a fearsome place of exploding shells and death." North
Vietnamese artillerymen fired 130mm artillery shells from caves or dug-in
positions on the Co Roc massif in
Laos
. These guns, out of the range of the largest
U.S.
artillery, had been firing on Khe Sanh for months. It was difficult to
prepare adequate defenses against them, since even dud rounds penetrated
four feet into the ground. The Americans were unable to destroy these
guns. In early June, the North Vietnamese gunners at Co Roc were still
able to fire more than 100 rounds in a single day into the base at Khe
Sanh. Marine Brig. Gen. Carl W. Hoffman claimed, "The North
Vietnamese still want Khe Sanh and we are still trying to keep them from
getting it." The general described the enemy as being composed of
"fresh, well-equipped troops with new haircuts and good morale, proof
we are facing not a rabble but well-trained force."
In the six weeks preceding that June
report, the Marines had killed about 1,300 North Vietnamese Army regulars
within a four-mile radius of Khe Sanh. During that time, American dead and
wounded had flowed in a steady stream to the Khe Sanh aid station, which
was dug deep into the ground. General Hoffman conceded that the Communists
had the ability to keep the Khe Sanh combat base under pressure for
"as long as they wished."
Months earlier, the Marines had made an
effort that, had it been successful, would have given them means to
counter the threat posed by the NVA heavy artillery at Co Roc. In August
1967, a large supply convoy left Dong Ha for Khe Sanh, including several
U.S. Army 175mm self-propelled guns. General Westmoreland had wanted to
position the guns at Khe Sanh to deal with NVA artillery in
Laos
. When the convoy ran into an enemy ambush along Route 9, however, the
decision was made to deploy the large guns at
Camp
Carroll
rather than risk their destruction at the ambush site.
That incident caused a change in thinking
about resupply for Khe Sanh. Route 9 was too risky; thereafter, during the
period from August 1967 until Route 9 was reopened in April 1968, Khe Sanh
would be resupplied by air. The reopening of the road was accomplished
through Operation Pegasus, a combined Marine and Army sweep of Route 9 to
the combat base.
With the arrival of the relief column, an
Army colonel replaced Colonel Lownds as base commander. Army troops would
replace the Marines, freeing them to go on the attack. Although ending the
siege freed the beleaguered Marines for offensive operations, it also gave
increased flexibility to the enemy forces. No longer would they have two
divisions tied down at Khe Sanh. Even though a large portion of the NVA
force withdrew into
Laos
near the DMZ, they could easily be shifted to other battlefields as
needed. One American official claimed the North Vietnamese withdrawal had
been prompted by the effectiveness of the American bombing campaign. The
U.S.
military command refused to say definitely whether it planned to keep
American troops at Khe Sanh. However, since the purpose of the base had
been to serve as a center for anti-infiltration activity before the siege,
some senior officers hinted that a continued American presence at Khe Sanh
was likely.
The reopening of Route 9 to convoy traffic
did not mean that the supply problem had been solved. These convoys faced
the same threats that they had in 1967. American units had to be stationed
at every bridge and culvert to guard against ambushes. Steep cliffs lined
the roadway, making it possible for the enemy almost to drop grenades into
passing trucks. Supplies moving overland were threatened by almost nightly
ambushes and firefights.
One June 16, Marines reported a North
Vietnamese attack on Marine positions south of Khe Sanh, in which 168
Communist soldiers were killed. Although the fighting continued, the
U.S.
command felt significant changes had taken place around Khe Sanh. Friendly
strength, mobility and firepower, had increased since the Army forces had
arrived, but the extent of the enemy threat had increased due to a greater
flow of replacements and a change in NVA tactics. Consequently, the base
at Khe Sanh was to be abandoned.
Senior Marine commanders had long felt that
maintaining a large force at Khe Sanh was more of a liability than an
asset. They had only garrisoned the place because of pressure from General
Westmoreland. In late 1967, an Army task force was formed to control
activity in this critical sector of
South Vietnam
; Westmoreland felt the Marines were unable to adequately direct the
battle. In March, Army Lt. Gen. William B. Rosson took command of the task
force. Unknown to General Westmoreland, Rosson and his Marine counterpart,
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, decided on their own in April to withdraw
American forces from Khe Sanh.
Naval gunfire experts and Air Force liaison
officers were sent to Khe Sanh to plan for the destruction of the Marine
positions. Marines began packing their equipment and filling in foxholes.
The base chaplain at Khe Sanh noted in his diary, "The general
attitude of people in the base is that it is wrong to abandon the base
after fighting so long for it."
When Westmoreland found out about Rosson
and Cushman's plan, a Marine general on Westmoreland's staff in
Saigon
claimed that he "never saw Westy so mad." The Marines at Khe
Sanh were notified that the base would not
be abandoned. They began unpacking their personal gear and started digging
in again.
Marines would continue to occupy Khe Sanh
and various nearby hill positions and engage in search and destroy
missions. Fresh Marine and Army units would replace the Marines who had
spent the siege at Khe Sanh. More than 400 American troops would be killed
and 2,300 wounded in the 10 weeks following the end of the siege. Those
figures were more than two times the casualties sustained by the Marines
in the siege during the period from late January to late March.
On
June 11, 1968
, General Westmoreland relinquished his command of
U.S.
forces in
Vietnam
. The Rosson-Cushman plan to abandon the base, previously rejected by
Westmoreland, was to be implemented. This version of the plan was dated
the day after Westmoreland turned control over to his successor, Army
General Creighton W. Abrams. The Marines who had fought at Khe Sanh were
furious, with one of the battalions "almost in open revolt" over
the decision.
ARTICLE WRITTEN BY PETER BRUSH
2003 entrance ticket to the
base
DATE LINE
1962
July - First Special
Forces A-detachment arrives at Khe Sanh
September - SF Detachment A-131 sent to Khe Sanh
September - Vietnamese engineers build first airstrip at Khe Sanh
1963
March - 70 ARVN
paratroopers jump into the French Fort area.
April - Two O-1B
observation planes come under heavy fire in the
valley between Hills 861 and 881.
1964
March - O-1B "Bird dog"
shot down. Pilot, Captain Richard Whitesides
becomes first American KIA at Khe Sanh.
Observer,
Captain Floyd Thompson is captured and
becomes the
longest held POW of the Vietnam War.
April - Marine Corps
sends the Signal Engineering Unit (SESU) to Khe
Sanh. Includes Marines from 1st Radio Company,
Company G
of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and a
section of 81mm
mortars. This is the first Marine ground
unit to conduct
independent operations in South Vietnam.
October - Strikers from Khe
Sanh make contact with confirmed NVA
troops just inside Laos. Provides proof
that Hanoi is
sending troops into the South.
1965
Special Forces builds camp next to airstrip. This camp becomes
the site of Khe Sanh Combat Base.
1966
April 17 - Marine Corps
conducts Operation VIRGINIA looking for NVA
May 1 troop concentrations between Hill 558 and Khe Sanh
Combat Base.
No significant contact was made.
June - SOG and
reconnaissance patrols report increased activity.
August Sightings of large NVA troop concentrations indicate
possible
attack in the Khe Sanh area.
September - Navy Mobile
Construction Battalion 10 arrives at Khe Sanh to
rebuild airstrip. Special Forces moves to
Lang Vei and 1st
Battalion, 3rd Marines moves to Khe Sanh.
1967
February - 1st Battalion,
3rd Marines replaced by single company,
Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines.
March 15 - Bravo Company,
1st Battalion, 9th Marines replaces E/2/9 as
resident defense company.
April 20 - Combat assets
at KSCB pass to operational control of Col.
Lanigan's 3rd Marines which commences
Operation PRAIRIE IV.
April 24 - B/1/9 patrol
engages large enemy force north of Hill 861 and
prematurely triggers attack on Khe Sanh.
"Hill Fights" begin.
April 25 - 2/3 and 3/3
airlifted to KSCB to counter enemy drive.
April 28 - After heavy
prep fires, Lt. Col. DeLong's 2/3 assaults and seizes
first objective, Hill 861.
May 2 - Lt. Col.
Wilder's 3/3 seizes Hill 881S after 4 days of heavy fighting.
May 3 - 2/3 repulses
strong enemy counterattack south of Hill 881N.
May 5 - 2/3 secures
final objective, Hill 881N.
May 11 - "Hill Fights"
terminate 940 NVA and 155 Marine KIA. 3rd Marines
May 13 shuttled to Dong Ha as 26th Marines (FWD) and 1/26
move into
Khe Sanh.
May 13 - Col. Padley, CO
26th Marines (FWD), relieves Col. Lanigan as Senior
officer present at Khe Sanh. Elements of
1/26 occupy combat base,
Hills 881S, 861, and 950. Operation
CROCKETT commences.
June 13 - Due to
increasing enemy contacts, LtCol Hoch's 3/26 airlifted
to KSCB.
July 16 - Operation
CROCKETT terminates with 204 NVA and 52
Marines KIA.
July 17 - Operation
ARDMORE begins.
August 12 - Col Lownds
relieves Col Padley as CO, 26th Marines.
August 13 - Due to lack of
significant contact around Khe Sanh, Company K & L,
3/26, transfered to 9th Marines and
Operation KINGFISHER.
August 17 - Khe Sanh
airfield closed to normal traffic for repair of runway.
Sept 3 - Remainder
of 3/26 withdrawn to eastern Quang Tri Province.
Oct 27 - Air strip
reopened to C-123 traffic.
Oct 31 - Operation
ARDMORE terminated with 113 NVA and 10 Marines KIA.
Nov 1 - Operation
SCOTLAND I begins
Nov 28 - MajGen Tompkins
assumes command of 3rd Marine Division.
Dec 13 - LtCol Alderman's
3/26 returns to Khe Sanh because of increased
enemy activity in the Khe Sanh TAOR.
Dec 21 - 3/26 conducts 5
day sweep west of base and uncovers evidence
of enemy buildup around KSCB.
1968
Jan 2 - Five NVA
officers killed near western edge of main perimeter. Intelligence
reports indicate influx of two NVA
divisions, and possibly a third, into
the Khe Sanh TAOR.
Jan 16 -17 LtCol Heath's
2/26 transferred to operational control of 26th Marines and
arrives KSCB; 2/26 occupies Hill 558
north of the base. ASRT-B of
MASS-3 displaces from Chu Lai to Khe Sanh
to handle ground
controlled radar bombing missions.
Jan 17 - Team from
"Bravo", 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion ambushed near Hill
881N.
Jan 19 - While searching
the recon ambush site, patrol from I/3/26 comes under fire
from an estimated 25 NVA troops and
withdraws under cover of supporting
arms. Two platoons from M/3/26 helilifted
to Hill 881S as reinforcements
for I/3/26 which prepares for sweep
toward Hill 881N the next day.
Jan 20 - Capt Dabney's
I/23/26 attacks and, with the aid of air and artillery, badly
mauls the NVA battalion entrenched on the
southern slopes of Hill 881N;
7 Marines and 103 NVA KIA. On strength of
testimony of captured NVA
lieutenant that enemy attack is imminent,
I/3/26 is withdrawn to Hill 881S
and KSCB is placed on Red Alert. DASC of
MASS-3 moves to Khe
Sanh.
Jan 20-21 Estimated NVA
battalion attacks K/3/26 on Hill 861. After penetrating
southwestern portion of Marines'
perimeter, the enemy is repulsed leaving
47 dead; NVA reserves are hit by heavy
air strikes and artillery fire.
Jan 21 - KSCB comes
under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket attack which
destroys main ammunition dump. NVA
battalion attacks and partially
overruns Khe Sanh village before CAC and
RF companies drive off enemy.
After second attack, Col Lownds withdraws
defenders to KSCB.
Jan 22 - US MACV
initiates Operation NIAGARA to provide massive air support
for Khe Sanh. LtCol Mitchel's 1/9 arrives
at KSCB and takes up
postions which encompass rock quarry
southwest of combat base. E/2/26
is relocated from Hill 558 to prominent
ridgeline northeast of 861 as
covering force for flank of 2/26; E/2/26
passes to operational control of 3rd
Battalion. New position is called 861
Alpha.
Jan 23-28 Large number of
tribesmen and families are evacuated from Khe Sanh area
to avoid hostile fire.
Jan 27 - 37th ARVN Ranger
Battalion arrives at KSCB and takes up positions in
eastern sector of combat base.
Jan 30 - Communists launch
nation-wide TET Offensive.
Feb 5 - NVA battalion
attacks E/2/26 on Hill 861A in concert with heavy shelling
of KSCB. Enemy gains foothold in northern
sector of Company E perimeter
but is driven out by savage counterattack;
109 NVA and 7 Marines KIA.
Feb 7 - Special Forces
camp at Lang Vei overrun by enemy battalion supported by
PT-76 Soviet-built tanks; first use of NVA
tanks in South Vietnam.
Feb 8 - Some 3,000
indigenous personnel, both military and civilian, from Lang Vei
move overland to Khe Sanh. After being
searched and processed, several
hundred refugees are air evacuated.
A/1/9
combat outpost 500 meters west of 1/9 perimeter hit and partailly
overrun by reinforced NVA battalion. During
three-hour battle, reinforcements
drive NVA from Marine positions and with the
aid of supporting arms kill
150 NVA; Col Lownds decides to abandon
outpost and units withdraw to
1/9 perimeter. 27 Marines from A/1/9 die in
battle.
Feb 10 - Marine C-130 of
VMGR-152, hit by enemy fire during approach, crashes after
landing at Khe Sanh and six are killed.
Feb - Apr Paradrops,
low-altitude extraction systems, and helicopters are primary means
of resupplying 26th Marines due to bad weather
and heavy enemy fire.
Feb 21 - After heavy mortar
and artillery barrage, NVA company probes 37th ARVN
Ranger lines but withdraws after distant fire
fight. It is estimated that 25-30
NVA were killed.
Feb 23 - KSCB receives record
number of incoming rounds for a single day - 1,307.
First appearance of enemy trench system around
KSCB.
Feb 25 - B/1/26 patrol
ambushed south of KSCB; 23Marines KIA. Patrol is later
called the "Ghost Patrol".
Feb 29 - Estimated NVA
regiment maneuvers to attack 37th ARVN Ranger positions
Mar 1 but fail to reach defensive wire.
Mar 6 - USAF C-123 shot down
east of runway; 43 USMC, 4 USAF, and 1 USN
personnel KIA.
Mar 7 - Large groups of
refugees begin to filter into the base and are evacuated.
Mar 8 - ARVN patrols attack
enemy trenchline east of runway and kill 26 NVA.
Mar 15 - American intelligence
notes withdrawal of major NVA units from KSCB area.
Mar 22-23 - KSCB receives
heaviest saturation of enemy rounds for the month - 1,109.
Mar 24 - A/1/9 patrol kills 31
NVA west of 1/9 perimeter.
Mar 25 - 1/9 CavSqd, 1st ACD
begins reconnaissance in force operations east of
Khe Sanh in preparation for Operation PEGASUS.
Mar 30 - B/1/26 attacks enemy
fortified position south of combat base and kills 115
North Vietnamese; 9 Marines are KIA. Operation
SCOTLAND I terminates
with 1,602 confirmed NVA and 205 Marines KIA;
estimates place probable
enemy dead between 10,000 and 15,000.
Task Force
KILO launches diversionary attack along Gio Linh coastal plain to
divert attention away from Ca Lu where 1st ACD,
and 1st Marines are staging
for Operation PEGASUS.
Apr 1 - Operation PEGASUS
begins; 2/1 and 2/3 (1st Marines) attack west from Ca Lu
along Route 9. Elements of 3d Bde, 1st ACD
conduct helo assaults into LZ
Mike and Cates. Joint engineer task force begins
repair of Route 9 from Ca Lu
to Khe Sanh.
Apr 3 - 2d Bde, 1st ACD
assaults LZs Tom and Wharton.
Apr 4 - 1/5 CavSqd moves
northwest from LZ Wharton and attacks enemy units near
old French fort; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
moves southeast from rock quarry
and assaults Hill 471.
Apr 5 - 1/9 repulses enemy
counterattack on Hill 471 and kills 122 North Vietnamese.
1st Bde, 1st ACD departs Ca Lu and assaults LZ
Snapper.
Apr 6 - One company of 3d
ARVN Airborne Task Force airlifted to KSCB for the
initial link up with defenders. Elements of 2d
Bde, 1st ACD relieve 1st Battalion,
9th Marines on Hill 471; 1/9 commences sweep to
northwest toward Hill 689.
1st Bde, 1st
ACD helilifted north of KSCB. 2/26 and 3/26 push north of combat
base; Company G, 2/26 engages enemy force and
kills 48 NVA.
Apr 8 - 2/7 CavSqd links up
with 26th Marines and conducts official relief of combat
base. 1/26 attacks to the west. 3d ARVN Airborne
Task Force air assaults into
LZ Snake west of Khe Sanh and kills 78 North
Vietnamese.
Apr 10 -
LtGen Rosson arrives Khe Sanh and directs LtGen Tolson to
disengage and
prepare for Operation DELAWARE in A Shau Valley.
Apr 11 - Engineers complete
renovation of Route 9 and road is officially opened. Elements
of 1st ACD begin withdrawal to Quang Tri City in
preparation for Operation
DELAWARE; 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion airlifted
to Da Nang.
Apr 12 - Col Meyers relieves
Col Lownds as CO, 26th Marines.
Apr 14 - 3/26 attacks Hill
881N and kills 106 NVA; 6 Marines are KIA.
Apr 15 - Operation PEGASUS
terminated; Operation SCOTLAND II begins.
Apr 18 - 26th Marines
withdrawn to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll.
May 23 - President Johnson
presents the Presidential Unit Citation to 26th Marines and
supporting units during White House ceremony.
Jun 23 - Although forward fire
support bases are maintained in Khe Sanh area, the KSCB
is dismantled and abandoned. LZ Stud at Ca Lu is
selected as base for air mobile
operations in western DMZ area.