Actions of 3rd Platoon

The following discussion of actions focuses on the 3^rd platoon, Fox Company, 2^nd Battalion 9^th Marines during the period of 26-30 March 1969.  One must consider that this account is being written some thirty-four years after the events of four fateful days. Consequently its accuracy must be judged in light of the considerable time past, but in many respects, still vivid memory.

Following Operation Dewey Canyon in the Ashau Valley most of the 9th Marines “stood down” and enjoyed some much deserved in country R+R for a few days  along the beaches near Cua Viet.  All of us recovered from the rigors of the past two and a half months that included the ubiquitous “jungle rot” that infected us all. Sometime thereafter, Fox Company was helolifted to Fire Support Base (FSB) Cates. The 3^rd platoon took over a small hill that overlooked the larger hill that was home to the actual FSB defended by the remainder of the company.

After a brief period at FSB Cates, Captain Sutton notified his platoon commanders that we would be moving out—to be “helolifted” via CH-46 to FSB Fuller situated atop Dong Ha Mt. (Ha meaning mountain in Vietnamese).  Our mission was to clear the vicinity of the FSB that had been subject to heavy automatic weapons fire that had been striking/endangering helicopters on their approach to that position.  As best as memory serves, the 3^rd platoon was the lead platoon into Fuller, and at least the lead helo  (and perhaps others) took several rounds on its final approach.  As it attempted to hover, with its ramp down ready to disgorge its Marines, it was struck and jerked violently into the air.  As it was struck, a Marine fully laden with “many pounds of equipment and ammunition who had been ready to jump from the helo found himself jumping, or better said, falling some 12-15 feet to the LZ below.  As one might expect, he sustained some injuries to his legs and or hips, he was subsequently “medevaced” never to return to the platoon.  As remaining helos approached and discharged Marines, F-4’s pounded nearly hilltops and suspected NVA positions with the familiar combination of “snake and nape”—250lb bombs and napalm.  (Note here: at least one helo made a forced landing on Route 9, unable to reach either Vandergrift or Quang Tri, secondly two members of the platoon recall our turning back on initial attempts to land on Fuller on the 25^th of March due to heavy fire. This may well be the case but not an event I can recall.)

Assembling the company on FSB Fuller, took some time, and indeed, a last minute helo arrived with mail and some new replacements for the company as we set off.  The 1^st platoon remained on FSB Fuller to provide enhanced security.  Moving down from FSB Fuller the going was rather difficult despite the fact that most of it was down hill.  Eventually establishing a position on a grassy knoll some 1200 (straight-line) meters south east of Dong Ha Mt., the company started to settle in and establish positions a little before dusk.  As darkness approached the 2nd platoon came under fire.  Almost simultaneously at one of 3^rd platoon’s machine gun positions that we had sited on the trial we had used to move into position a North Vietnamese blundered into the position and was promptly killed. I cannot recall exactly but a number of Marines from the 2^nd platoon were wounded, notable among them was to the best of my recollection, the platoon guide.  Whatever the case, the wounded were evacuated and the next morning the company swept around the position discovering several North Vietnamese machine gun positions (Circular holes-5-6 feet in diameter and perhaps 4 feet deep that could accommodate their 12.7 mm MG and tripod).  Policing up NVA equipment and dead took some time and it must have been late morning or early afternoon before the company struck off almost due east towards Dong Ma Mt., a large rounded hill mass covered in relatively short (12-18”) elephant grass.  The sky was relatively clear and the heat and humidity were absolutely oppressive—even for Vietnam.  Moving up to Dong Ma Mt. was no easy task and keeping the Marines on line and spread out for the last 500-600 meters, partially uphill, required a good deal of “moving” up and down the line as well as my most persuasive language.  Finally getting to the top of Dong Ma the company “dug-in” and tired to the bone settled in for the night.  During this evening of the 27^th after darkness fell some NVA, who must not have known of the company’s presence, carrying resupply that included a sack of rice were engaged by the platoon with grenades and limited rifle fire. The next morning three dead NVA were located 20-25 meters from our position. 

As we policed up the NVA dead, I’m a bit uncertain here but either and OV-10 or a helo “beat up” a small knob some 300 meters to the east, north east of our present position; we’d be moving across that knob as we moved towards Hill 126.  With the 1^st squad in the lead, the platoon led the company off of Dong Ma Mt. down a small draw, towards that unnamed small knob that had received “attention” from Marine air earlier that morning.

Initially moving parallel to that position the point man left the trail and moved straight up the hill towards the top of that small but deadly position.  As he approached the crest of the hill, a light machine gun opened up on him from very close range.  He must not have been killed immediately in that it was later discovered that he had a grenade in his hand with the pin pulled.  After he went down two other Marines rushed forward and both were killed almost instantly.  Both of these Marines had been with the platoon for several months and were well-liked “old hands” whose presence, along with that of the point man would be sadly missed.  I ordered the 2^nd squad on line to sweep the back side of the knob.  The squad immediately drew a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire as well as well as a number of Chicom grenades.  In all too brief a period of time they sustained several casualties.  Notified that “air” was on its way, I pulled the squad and platoon back down the small draw.  In this process we took some fire from a 12.7 MG from a hill mass some 600-800 meters to our immediate rear.  One of our alert machine gunners quickly returned deadly, telling fire on the enemy position. Somewhere in the course of all this I presume Captain Sutton worked the air into vicinity of our position.

Following the air strikes, we policed up the NVA position, searched the NVA dead for anything that might be of intelligence value and evacuated our dead and wounded and now excess equipment.  In the continuing oppressive heat of the early afternoon,  I recall during this period the only heat warning I ever received being relayed from battalion over the company net,  the company pressed on to a small ridge line south, south east of Hill 126.

Moving towards the ridge/hill, the platoon was moving in single file and descended into a deep and steep gully or small gorge.  About half way down this terrain feature, one of the nearby Marines motioned to me pointing to the top of the ridgeline. I immediately looked up and saw three of four NVA moving along the ridgeline.  Owing to our precarious and exposed position with the enemy moving about the hill or ridge to our immediate front, above us, I ordered our 60mm mortar team “up” and to commence engaging the ridge line, and simultaneously yelled for all to hear—to get to the top of the ridge line—NOW!! The mortar team found its mark quickly and after dropping packs the 3^rd platoon swept up to and over the objective without incident.  However, it was becoming obvious that there were NVA scattered all about the area and that the going was to get no easier. Since the platoon’s 60mm tube had been found to have a hair line crack in the tube after Operation Dewey Canyon, we were now using a Chicom 61mm mortar that filled the bill quite nicely, though its shorter tube deprived us of the maximum range we had been accustomed to—its max range with US ammunition was approximately 1500 meters.

We set up for  the evening on the ridge and the company commander called his platoon commanders together to look over the next day's immediate objective—Hill 126.   Some 600 or perhaps 800 meters almost due north.  There was virtually no cover or concealment in the approach to Hill 126l.  3^rd platoon would take the point in moving along the terrain -- rolling gently down and then up along broad, rounded fingers covered in short elephant grass.  I recall looking at Hill 126 from  that evening position on 28 March; its striking feature,  that remains with me to this day,  was several large boulders,  that for all the world looked to me like tombstones. This was an impression that for understandable reasons I kept to myself. The next morning dawned bright and hot.  Several artillery rounds struck on or near Hill 126, an OV-10 came on station and the artillery ceased. The 3^rd squad took the lead, a fire team as well as gun team on line with fire teams to either flank of the line, fire teams echeloned left and right respectively—some 16 Marines in all.  The remainder of the platoon moved at staggered column with attention to our flanks.  Moving deliberately the lead squad reached the base of the hill and moved past the “boulders” and into the tree line on Hill 126.  They proceeded on to the reverse slope (back side of the hill towards the north), where they were to set up a 180—defensive position covering Hill 126 from any enemy to our north.  As I got adjacent to the “boulders,” all hell broke loose, with fire from our front as well as left flank.  As I came to fully realize later, within that first 15 –20 seconds or perhaps less, two of my Marines were killed and several were wounded.  The remainder of the platoon moved forward -–suppressing enemy fire, attempting to reach our dead and wounded.  Attempts to recover wounded Marines brought more casualties to include a squad leader who was severely wounded in proximity to one of his wounded Marines, a Marine who was killed by the impact of what was then described as an RPG.  Fighting continued in some ferocity for an hour or so with more Marines wounded and one more 3^rd platoon Marine killed.  On this day by 1030 or so, the platoon suffered four killed and 10-12 wounded, and things were not going to get better any time soon. In the intervening time between the initial contact and 1000-1030, the company commander ordered the 2nd platoon with elements of a squad of third platoon to sweep the left rear (west side) of Hill 126.  An OV-10 was on station, and I imagine the observer requested that the two platoons mark their positions so he could judge how much room he had to employ air or artillery.  I ordered 3rd platoon Marines near me down to the right (east) side of the hill to get them under cover for the anticipated assault of the 2nd platoon that would be coming up the west side of the hill.   Smoke grenades were thrown in the direction of the other platoon, almost immediately the observer noted over the net that the smoke grenades had crossed in flight—the NVA and Marines of Fox Company was now “belly-to belly”—there was no room for the use of supporting arms. The strength of the NVA positions was substantial and the 2^nd platoon suffered a number of casualties in attempting to link up with the rest of the company on Hill 126. Some time after this the NVA made an unsuccessful bid to seize the crest of the hill.

Without the prospect of linking up with the 2nd platoon, we eventually shortened out lines on Hill 126, and the company commander coordinated efforts to medevac the most seriously wounded and get delivery of additional ammunition and medical supplies. The first effort at medevac was turned back due to heavy fire from several NVA machine gun positions that ringed Hill 126.  Getting on towards dusk an Army UH-I arrived on scene and “dumped” several crates of ammunition and took aboard our most seriously wounded. This pilot saved the life of at least one Marine, who surely would have bled to death.

As the day wore on sporadic fighting and jockeying for position took place and finally the “OV” was able to get off some well placed 2.75” rockets to the immediate north of our lines on Hill 126.   Probing by the NVA lasted well past midnight , and finally the heaviest of the fighting ended, but not before “PUFF” silenced at least one heavy machinegun position with its “minigun” shortly after midnight.  Dawn brought the quick realization that the NVA had broken contact. As we gathered our dead and treated our wounded Echo 2/9 moved into and reinforced our position.  With “our hill” policed up, late in the morning of the 30^th, the approximately 16 Marines of the 3^rd platoon (to include some with minor wounds) moved off in trace of the 2nd platoon towards Route 9.  Enroute the company passed over a hill from which we had taken fire on the 28th, around what obviously was a heavy machine gun position lay several NVA blood soaked battle dressings. Boarding trucks on Route 9, we traveled to Vandergrift Combat Base where we rejoined two of our number who had been on R&R.  It took them some time to come to grips with the fact that one six-by (truck) had delivered the entire 3^rd platoon to Vandergrift. The platoon that they had left a few short days before was no more.  A platoon that had been “golden” (free of combat casualties) for so long, had been decimated in every sense of the word. Two days after returning to Vandergrift a memorial service was held for the Marines of Fox Company killed in the course of two especially dreadful days of March, 1969. Days that changed all who were there; days that make every Memorial Day and every flag draped coffin, a time of vivid memory of Marines who gave their all 34 years ago in a far off land.