January 22nd  to March 18th 1969

THE SMELL OF NAPALM from the movie Apocalypse NOW

courtesy of www.popasmoke.com

Fire Base Cunningham

PICTURE BY TOM PILSCH

PHOTO ARCHIVES

The sappers were organized into five groups. Group 1, led by Comrade An, consisted of 16
men divided into four-man teams. The first team was assigned to attack the command operations
center and mortar positions. The second team was to attack to the right and link up with Comrade
Bong’s Group 2 at the helicopter-landing zone. The third team was to attack to the left, assault
through the landing zone and link up with Group 3, led by Comrade Tan. The fourth team was to
attack to the front toward the landing zone.

Group 2 consisted of 15 men divided into four teams led by Comrade Bong. His first four man
team was assigned to attack and destroy the artillery fire direction control center and other
battery facilities on the east end of the fire support base. The second team was to attack artillery
positions to the right while the third four-man team attacked artillery positions to the left. The
remaining three-man team was designated the group’s reserve force.

Comrade Tam’s Group 3 consisted of 12 men divided into four three-man teams
concentrating on the west end of the fire support base. The first team was assigned to attack
artillery positions to the left. The second team was to attack to the right, advancing and exploiting
contact with the Group 1 leader, Comrade An. The third team was to attack directly forward and.
then link up with a fourth group, led by Comrade Pha, for the mop-up operations. The fourth team
would be held in reserve.

Pha’s group was organized to function as the extraction force to assist in the withdrawal of
the grou0s assaulting specific objectives. A fifth group of over 100 men would provide the
assaulting forces with a base of fire utilizing RPG’s, mortars, automatic weapons and small-arms
fire.

The attack forces moved out from their various base camps at 7:30 a.m. Using previously
reconned routes, they executed a covered approach to their final assembly areas. Movement was
initiated many hours prior to the assault phase as the sappers had deliberately chosen the most
difficult avenues of approach to the target in order to avoid observation.

By 6 p.m. all the NVA sapper groups were only 100 meters outside the concertina-wire
obstacles surrounding FSB Cunningham. The NVA sappers slowly crept to assault positions just
outside the defensive wire, aided by reduced visibility. There was little moonlight and a thick
blanket of fog enveloped not only the fire support base but all routes of entry to it. Although the
approach was slow and cautious, the assault itself would be made with utmost speed. The sappers
assumed that the majority of the defenders would be driven into their bunkers by the mortar attack
that would precede their assault. The sappers knew that once the defensive obstacles were breached
under this covering fire, the bunkers would become death traps for the Marines.

In anticipation of the Lunar New Year (or Tet) cease-fire, the roaring of the big artillery
pieces on FSB Cunningham fell silent at midnight, although the allied countrywide 24-hour truce
went into effect a 6 p.m. on February 16.

At precisely 2 a.m., the NVA mortar sections commenced placing accurate supporting fire
on previously plotted primary targets, mortar positions, the command bunker, artillery positions
and communications bunkers. The Marines could hear the mortar rounds as they were tubed. The
devastatingly accurate mortar fire forced the Marines into their bunkers where they felt safe due to
a minimum overhead cover of at least four layers of sandbags.

In the midst of the noise, damage and confusion, it was immediately obvious that key
installations were the target of the intense barrage. The Marines in fighting holes on the perimeter
kept their heads down.

The Marine defensive positions were manned on the northern slope by the men of Lima
Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. Defensive positions on the flanks and along the
southern edge of the ridge were manned by a combination of Marines from the artillery units and
Colonel Barrow’s headquarters group. In addition, a reaction force of 50 Marines from the
communications, engineer and staff sections of the headquarters group were on standby as a
reserve defensive force.

The mortar barrage reached a crescendo a 2:15 a.m. as the NVA assault groups began their
efforts to breach the defensive obstacles. The initial assault wave came from the northeast. The
sappers made liberal use of Bangalore torpedoes fashioned from half-pound blocks of TNT lashed
together between bamboo sticks. The ingenious attack route lay through one of the many trash.
dumps with well-worn paths leading to every major battery facility.

Mats, brush and other local materials were thrown across the barbed wire obstacles. As the
mortar fire was lifted, rocket-propelled Chicom grenades, satchel charges and the Bangalore
torpedoes created the impression that the mortars were still firing, serving to keep the defenders on
the perimeter positions inside their bunkers. The Marines were suffering from too may head ringing
explosions to notice the difference. For hours before the cease-fire began, the artillery
batteries at the fire support bases had been hammering away in direct support of other defensive
positions. The cacophony of noise was deafening. The NVA sappers who broke through the
defensive wire barriers tossed concussion grenades and satchel charges into every open hole they
could find. The RPG’s (rocket-propelled grenades) and automatic weapons fire of the NVA base
group was concentrated on the firing slits and ports of the bunkers. Although the situation was
confusing, the Marines quickly realized that they were under ground attack and responded
ferociously, organizing an effort to clear the base in the face of heavy enemy mortar and recoilless
rifle fire.

The sapper attack was an unforgettable experience for Navy Lt. Cmdr. (chaplain) David
Brock, who later told the division chaplain: “During the early moments of the attack, and NVA
soldier stuck his head into the tent where I and two others were rising, but fortunately, did not
throw a grenade inside. A grenade was thrown into a small bunker a few feet away, killing two
men.”

Chaplain Brock remembers: “The firefight lasted until almost 7:45 a.m. and during this
time I stayed with the doctor in the Aid Station in order to administer last rites and to help with the
wounded. For two hours it looked as if the Aid Station would be made a last stand. During the
firefight various thoughts went through my mind, such as: Would we live through this? Will the
men be able to hold out? How were the young men on the lines doing? I must admit that I was
scared but the feeling soon passed because we were too busy. The others were afraid too but not one
of them showed his fear. As a matter of fact, it warmed one’s heart to see just how well these young
men did in the face of death.”

Lieutenant Commander Brock was one of the regiment’s rather unique lot of chaplains, who
almost seemed as if they were handpicked to serve with this particular group of hard-nosed
Marines. Brock had seen action in the European Theatre of Operations as a U.S. Army Sergeant in
World War II. He earned a Navy Commendation Medal with combat “V” and a Vietnamese Cross.
of Gallantry with a silver star in Vietnam.

The officer in charge of the fire support base was partially buried in a caved-in bunker
during the mortar attack. As he crawled out, he came face to face with one of the sappers. The
Marine had a grenade in his hand but was too close to the enemy soldier to use it. He leaped on the
surprised enemy soldier and bludgeoned him to death with the heavy base of the grenade.

Using his personal knife as his primary weapon, the Company Gunnery Sergeant killed
several of the sappers in hand-to-hand combat. Marines from the 106mm battery, who had manned.
a machine gun in the southeast portion of the fire support base, assaulted and killed six NVA
soldiers who were attempting to organize a strongpoint inside the perimeter. The cooks from India
Battery accounted for 13 enemy killed when they manned a 50-caliber machine gun.

The defensive perimeter had been penetrated by several dozen sappers wearing only olive
green shorts and skullcaps. They all carried pack full of explosives and were armed with shoulder fired
RPG’s, satchel charges, bamboo mines, small arms and grenades.

The artillery battalion’s fire direction control center was put out of action, as was one
howitzer. During the period from 4:10 a.m. to daylight only one of the Marines’ mortars remained
in action. The mortar team stayed with their weapon throughout the assault, re-establishing
communications with the commander in the fire direction control center and firing a total of 380
rounds.

Corporal Jim Best recalls the attack as a blur of indistinct memories. “There were red and
green tracers flashing overhead, men screaming and explosions everywhere. I lay there hugging the
ground thinking I may not get out, wondering if we’d been overrun.” Although penetrated, the
Marine lines held and at times only a scant five feet separated the combating forces. Men not
actively engaged in direct confrontations with the enemy forces were busy coordinating HEAT
(high-explosive anti-tank) and illumination artillery fire or providing other support services.
Artillery officers were coordinating fire missions while at the same time an air officer was on the
radio requesting helicopter gunship support.

Lieutenant Raymond C. Benfatti, Commanding Officer of Company L, was severely
wounded by an impacting rocket-propelled grenade during the initial moments of the attack.
Ignoring his painful injuries, Benfatti steadfastly refused medical evacuation and boldly shouted
words of encouragement to his men. He directed their fire against the infiltrating sappers and two
supporting infantry companies until the hostile sapper unit was ejected from the perimeter.

Despite the enemy rounds impacting all around him, Lieutenant Benfatti quickly organized
a reaction force and supervised his Marines in evacuating the casualties and replacing wounded
Marines in defensive emplacements. As the enemy support units pressed their attack upon the
perimeter, Benfatti continued his determined efforts, repeatedly exposing himself to intense hostile
fire as he directed the efforts of his men in repulsing the enemy attack.

A flare ship was called on station to provide illumination outside the perimeter wire. It
would remain on station throughout the night as the battle raged until dawn. With flares lighting
up the night, a group of clerks, radio operators and engineers began a systematic drive to eliminate
the enemy forces within the perimeter. Throughout the battle, Benfatti called for artillery fires
from the batteries located on the mutually supporting fire-bases to surround FSB Cunningham in a
curtain of hot steel. This supporting fire prevented enemy reinforcements and exploitation of
breaches in the wire and also rendered impossible the retreat of the sappers already inside the
compound.

At about 5:30 a.m. the Marines completed the reorganization of their positions and began
slowly but methodically to break up the sapper attack. As dawn broke, the spirited defenders were
mopping up the remnants of the enemy assault force. Contact, however, was not broken until 7 a.m.

Jim Best describes the end of the battle; “The fighting slowed and it was a few moments
before I realized that the fire support base was d4ad silent. There were no sounds, only the fear of
not knowing the exact situation.”

AS the sun rose, the light and warmth it brought created a calming sense of temporary
peace at FSB Cunningham. When it became apparent that the NVA had withdrawn for good, the
counting began. Lieutenant Benfatti, who would win the Silver Star Medal for his actions during
the attack, supervised the medical evacuation of casualties and ascertained the welfare of his
Marines, resolutely refusing medical attention for his own wounds until all the other wounded men
had been cared for.

The Marines found a total of 25 NVA bodies inside their defensive wires. One of those bodies
was that of a sapper officer. Documents found on his body were examined, translated and analyzed
by the 15th Interrogator/Translator Team, revealing the detailed planning of the attack described
above.

Searching the enemy bodies, the Marines captured 26 RPG rounds, 25 Chicom grenades,
253 bamboo explosive devices, seven rifle grenades, 12 packs, two radios, 11 AK-47 rifles and
numerous signal flares. The packs contained large quantities of marijuana and other drugs.

The use of narcotics,” platoon leader Milton J. Teixeira said, “made them a lot harder to
kill. Not one of the gooks we had inside the perimeter had less than three or four holes in him.
Usually it took a grenade or something to stop him completely.”

A final tally of the battle damage revealed 4 Marines killed in action, 46 Marines
wounded in action and 37 NVA killed in action. In “E” Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, had
taken heavy battle damage. Surveying the smoke-shrouded fire support base, Colonel Barrow said:
“They’ll probably think twice from here on out before taking on another Marine headquarters
group. These lads did a fantastic job in what could have been a nasty situation. They were 100
percent professional fighting men; good Marines all the way.”

Michael R. Conroy, a Marine veteran of the Vietnam War, is working on a book on Operation.
Dewey Canyon..
Suggestions for further reading:.

• The Vietnam Experience: Fighting for Time, by Samuel Lipsman and Edward Doyle.
(Boston Publishing Company, 1983);
• The War in the Northern Provinces, by Willard Pearson (U.S. Government Printing Office,.
1975).